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After the end of ‘really existing socialism’ in 1989-1991, the world witnessed
the advent of triumphant capitalism, of ‘really existing globalization,’ a period of
ideological and, more importantly, utopian crises. Without a strong vision for a different
future, technotopia and electronic and computer capitalism imposed themselves.
Flexible post-Fordist capitalism and a new round of time-space compression, fostered
above all by the Internet, were then able to spread everywhere.
Similarly to what happened with ‘development’ after World War II (see Ribeiro
1992, Escobar 1995, Rist 1997), ‘globalization” since the 1990’s has become an
indicator in capitalist transformation and integration processes.  Further, it has become
an ideology and a utopia, a veritable mantra - formulae, recited by transnational,
international and national elites. I want to stress that ‘globalization’ represents to the
post Cold War period (1989/1991-present) what ‘development’ represented to the Cold
War period. There is a main difference, though. During the Cold War years, the division
of the world into two major antagonic forces, socialism and capitalism, created a mirror-
like system of alternatives. In the bi-polar world, socialism was often seen as the overall
alternative to capitalism and vice-versa. Interestingly enough, both sides shared the
belief in the development of production forces as a means to attain progress and a better
life. 
As hegemonic ideologies and utopias, development and globalization are often
met with counter-hegemonic discourses and practices. Alternative development has
been a rather diversified power field. In the past three decades, environmentalism has
been the most visible and effective of the alternative discourses within the power field
in which the discussion on development is situated. Some environmentalists have
radical positions, adamant against any kind of development, such as the zero growth
banner. At the same time, others have presented reformist positions that accept
negotiations with developmental agencies (the World Bank, for instance). Such
negotiation processes led in the late 1980’s, to the definition of ‘sustainable
development,’ a semi-operational formulation. The peak of sustainable development’s
mobilizing and reformist power occurred with the United Nations Conference on the
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3Environment and Development, in 1992 (Ribeiro 1992, Little 1995). Not surprisingly,
after the Rio-92 sustainable development has increasingly lost its alternative character
and become another normalized and institutionalized discourse ruled by corporate and
government interests. Sustainable development’s climax coincided with the end of the
Cold War, a period when really existing socialism was retreating to backstage and when
the utopian metanarratives of the 19th century reached their limits. With the opening up
of the period of triumphant capitalism, ‘development’ increasingly had to share space
with ‘globalization,’ another powerful recipe for a good life and humankind’s destiny.
NON-HEGEMONIC GLOBALIZATION
Hegemonic globalization has been characterized by multinational and
transnational agents’ actions to seek out neoliberal capitalist goals: state reduction,
structural adjustment, privatization and support for private enterprise and capital,
redirection of national economies towards foreign markets, free global trade, weakening
labor legislation, scaling down or phasing out the welfare state, etc. Financial capital
and transnational corporations are often considered as the main agents of globalization.
Indeed, the discussion on globalization tends to focus on processes commanded by
powerful agents and agencies in a top-down perspective, thus ignoring other processes.
Nonetheless, there is a growing body of literature on ‘globalization from below’, almost
exclusively focused on political resistance movements to neoliberal globalization. Its
main subjects are global civil society, transnational social movements and activists (see,
for instance, Aguiton 2003; Edwards and Gaventa 2001; Keane 2003; Keck and Sikkink
1998;  Rosenau 1992; Seoane and Taddei 2001; Vieira 2001; Yuen 2001). This bias
hinders researchers from seeing other forms of non-hegemonic globalization especially
the one I call ‘economic globalization from below’ 
In this text, I want to shed light on the hidden side of globalization’s political
economy, the one in which nation states’ normative and repressive roles are heavily
bypassed both on the political and economic spheres. With a view to understanding
‘other globalizations,’ I will explore alternative political and economic processes and
agents.
Political non-hegemonic globalization: the anti/alter-globalization movement
The 1992 U.N. conference in Rio, the most important mega global ritual of
transnational elites in the late 20th century, was also an important structuring moment
for the alternative globalization movement. It provided a particularly strategic and
pioneering opportunity for environmentalist NGOs and social movements to meet at a
parallel event, the Global Forum, precursor to the World Social Forums, and the first
occasion on which global civil society met in real public space (Ribeiro 2000).
Environmental activism’s transnational characteristics provided the basis for
discussions on notions of transnational citizenship and, more importantly, for
articulations of transnational networks as a regulating power against neoliberal
globalization. 
Rio-92 also provided a template that was to shape the scenarios where pro- and
anti-globalization networks would meet. This template is a triangle made up of (1) the
meeting of the global and transnational establishment and managers (in Rio this was the
United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development, held at a convention
center in Jacarepaguá); (2) the meeting of global civil society’s transnational elite (in
4Rio, the Global Forum meeting); and (3) transnational activists’ street demonstrations
against neoliberal globalization.
Since 1992, political counter-hegemonic efforts regarding globalization have
increased. The plural composition of movements and coalitions – as well as the
diversity of ideological and agenda goals – may be conceived in terms of two major
parties: one is identified with anti-globalization while the other with alternative
globalization or altermondialisation, as the French call it2. This internal division echoes
that which existed within the alternative development camp. The difference in positions
reflects radical and reformist perspectives. Those who believe that globalization is not
inevitable, that it can be stopped or radically changed, comprise the anti-globalization
movement. This movement usually expresses itself through ad-hoc coalitions that
organize street demonstrations. There are also those who believe that ‘another world is
possible’ that eventually, globalization can and must be tamed. These make up the
alternative globalization movement and have mostly been linked to the world of NGOs,
understood as ‘the new political subjects’ of the 1980’s and 1990’s. In fact, many of
them are part of transnational political elites that have consistently evolved after World
War II in an environment saturated with networking among NGOs themselves; NGOs
and multilateral agencies, notably the United Nations and multilateral banks; and among
NGOs and national governments. 
Given the existence of these two major segments I will term the political
counter-hegemonic movement the anti/alter-globalization movement. The literature on
the anti/alter-globalization movement still needs to increase in quantity and complexity.
There is a special need for ethnographies. Most of this literature is made up of works
written by activists, NGO members, as well as by the movement’s leaders and
ideologues. There are also essays by scholars with different degrees of knowledge,
theoretical sophistication and sympathy for global/transnational activism. It is not
uncommon to find among them researchers that were previously interested in the
analysis of the environmental movement and that switched to the discussion on
transnational activism and global civil society. The latter body of literature is where the
more elaborate works and thoughts may be found (see Keck and Sikkink 1998; and
Keanes 2003, for instance). For researchers interested in doing ethnographies there are
two highly promising scenarios to investigate. The street demonstrations are the best
scenarios to see anti-globalization activists in action, while the World Social Forums are
the best scenarios to see alter-globalization activists in motion. 
Street Demonstrations
Neoliberalism and global trade without barriers fuelled the shrinking of the
world under the hegemony of flexible capitalism. The time was ripe for new institutions
to congeal. This is typically the case with the World Trade Organization, a global
institution committed to fostering, administering and overseeing global trade as well as
to settling disputes among member countries. The WTO was established in 1994. It
began operations in 1995 and rapidly became, together with the post World War II
institutions (World Bank, International Monetary Fund and the United Nations), one of
the most powerful members of the global management select club. WTO presents itself
as ‘the successor to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) established in
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5the wake of the Second World War.3 Notwithstanding this genealogical relation, the
World Trade Organization’s reach in keeping with the hegemony of electronic and
computer capitalism went well beyond that of GATT’s since it included not only trade
in merchandise goods but also in services (international telephone services, for instance)
and intellectual property protection. The WTO’s power caught the attention of a
growing anti-globalization activism.
  Since the late 1990’s, anti-globalization street demonstrations have proliferated
always closely monitored and often repressed by the police.4 From May 18 through
May 20, 1998, thousands of protesters marched through Geneva’s streets in protest
against the World Trade Organization’s 50th anniversary celebrations. One hundred and
seventeen people were arrested. In June 1999 (18-20) 35,000 marchers took to the
streets of Cologne, Germany, during a G7 meeting to demand the cancellation of poor
countries’ foreign debt. On November 30th, 1999, the street demonstration in Seattle
against WTO’s ministerial conference, the organization’s top level decision-making
body, took place.  This was for many the anti-globalization movement’s foundational
event.  It was surely a prominent moment but there were other important antecedents in
the global South such as the protests against IMF Structural Adjustment Programs
which started in the late 1970’s, ‘peaking perhaps in the 1989 Caracas uprising’ (Yuen
2001: 6) and the Zapatista rebellion, in 1994, a source of inspiration for an ‘increasingly
militant movement of global resistance to neoliberalism’ (Callahan 2001: 37).5  Mary
King (2000: 3-4) considers that the anti-globalization movement:
‘traces its own lineage in a half myth, half vernacular history to an invitation that
floated over the Internet to all who would travel to The Zapatista Conference
Against Neoliberalism and for Humanity in Chiapas, 1996. Many participated
and what emerged from that gathering was a nebulous entity called Global
Action, not an organization or a NGO itself but rather a self consciously political
movement which cast a wide and tattered net. (…) From the Zapatista
philosophy the movement adopted an ethics of radical inclusion and self-
mobilization.’
The intensity of the ‘Seattle battle,’ the political victory that the obstruction of
the WTO’s ministerial meeting implied, as well as the visibility it had in the media
showed that the anti-globalization movement was gaining momentum and made Seattle
1999 the primary symbol of a period when people regained the streets to struggle
against globalization. In Seattle, 50,000 people were on the streets and more than 500
were arrested. 
The year 2000 was particularly busy. There were demonstrations on January 29,
against the World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland; in February, in Bangkok,
against the Tenth Summit of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development
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6(UNCTAD); on April 15-17 in Washington during an IMF meeting; on June 14, in
Bologna, against the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s
(OECD) meeting; on June 21-23, demonstrators protested in Okinawa, during a G7
meeting, for the cancellation of third world debt and the withdrawal of the American
base; in September between ten-thirty thousand people demonstrated in Melbourne,
against a meeting of the World Economic Forum. That same month, on the 26th, during
the Fifth Global Action Day, activists from many countries were focusing on the
demonstrations that were to take place in Prague against a joint IMF – World Bank
meeting. In the capital of the Czech Republic, environmentalists, religious groups,
unionists, socialists, communists, anarchists and punks surrounded the convention
center and engaged in skirmishes with the police. Simultaneously, different
demonstrations happened around the world. In Brasilia, for instance, a small group of
punks demonstrated in front of Brazil’s Central Bank. In São Paulo, students,
environmentalists, and unionists demonstrated in front of the stock market. In other
Brazilian cities, such as Fortaleza and Belo Horizonte, protesters gathered in front of
such ‘capitalist symbols’ as a Citibank branch and a MacDonald’s. In tune with
escalating police repression of these demonstrations, in July 2001, in Genoa, Italy,
during an anti-G-8 demonstration, a young man, Carlo Giuliani, was killed by the
police. 
September 11th, 2001, undoubtedly posted a new warning on the horizon. Anti-
terrorism became a major preoccupation for powerful state elites and the agenda became
heavily marked by the threat of war. In the United States, the Bush administration
passed stringent security laws. But that did not imply, especially outside the United
States, that the anti-globalization movement had come to a halt (see Aguiton 2003). In
Europe, in Florence, there was another great demonstration in November, 2002. Almost
one million people went to the streets on the last day of the gathering of the European
Social Forum. There were also the second and third editions of the World Social Forum
(see below), in Porto Alegre, in January 2002 and 2003, which brought together more
than 50,000 people from many different countries. Also, twenty thousand participants
attended the Asian Social Forum in Hyderabad, India in January 2003. At the same
time, after September 11th, the possible invasion of Iraq unleashed a movement for
peace that resulted in the largest global demonstration ever. Cyberspace’s
instrumentality in transnational articulation proved again its effectiveness during the
organization of the ‘greatest anti-war demonstration in history,’ according to the
Brazilian newspaper Folha de São Paulo (February 16, 2003). On February 15, 2003,
more than 5 million people in about 60 countries took to the streets to protest against the
United States war against Iraq (see table 1)6.
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7Table 1
City Protesters City Protesters
Barcelona 1.3 million Oslo 60,000
Rome 1 million Brussels 50,000
London 750,000 Buenos Aires 10,000
Madrid 660,000 São Paulo 8,000
Berlin 600,000 Cape Town 5,000
Paris 250,000 Tokyo 5,000
New York 250,000 Auckland 5,000
Damascus 200,000 Rio de Janeiro 3,000
Melbourne 160,000 Santiago de Chile 3,000
Athens 150,000 Tel Aviv 3,000
Amsterdam 70,000 Total 5,542,000
Source: Folha de São Paulo, February 16, 2003.
The anti-globalization movement’s international expansion has increased its
heterogeneity and brought new political challenges for its reproduction. Its heterodox
diversity, highly praised for its effectiveness and novelty, also means a more complex
political environment in which political alliance problems abound. Suffice it to
enumerate the different actors that come together in these scenarios: punks, anarchists,
students, unionists, environmentalists, peasants, feminists, human rights activists,
scholars, intellectuals, and politicians. Most have progressist leanings and come from a
different array of countries. Nevertheless, different combinations of such actors may
vary according to where the demonstrations take place. In Europe, especially in
countries with strong socialist traditions, socialist politicians, for instance, may also take
part in these events. 
Some of the organizations that planned Seattle in 1999, like People’s Global
Action, Direct Action Network, Independent Media Center, Earth First! and Global
Exchange have remained engaged in the anti-globalization movement. Direct Action
Network was particularly active in the preparation of the Seattle demonstration and
became a ‘soft structure’ (Aguiton 2003:9) that in events such as the Washington
demonstration against the IMF and the World Bank in April 2000, organized ‘spokes-
councils,’ meetings with delegates from the different groups involved and which were
held in churches before the demonstrations (idem). 
Anti-globalization is a movement in which young people make up the majority.
They are well aware of the new media’s effectiveness in the mobilization effort. The
Internet has been crucial to the movement’s articulation on the global level while cell
phones are often used to organize street demonstration tactics. In addition to flexibility
and horizontality in the decision-making process, some of the main characteristics of the
movement’s organizational structure are related to an overall but not complete adhesion
to (1) ‘the tradition of mass civil disobedience commonly known as Non-Violent Direct
Action’ (Yuen 2001:8) and (2) a commitment to direct democracy (idem). Its
organizational forms include, besides decentralized spokes-council meetings, ‘affinity
groups’ and consensus process. According to Eddie Yuen (ibidem):
‘Ideological nonviolence and a deep commitment to direct democracy can … be
seen as twin responses to the negative model of authoritarian Marxist-Leninist
parties intent on seizing state power which had appealed to many radicals in the
last century. The notion of pre-figurative politics – in which the means for
8attaining a nonviolent, noncapitalist and truly democratic society must be
consistent with the goal – remains at the core of the direct action movement.
Many activists in the new movement, however, appear interested in decoupling
radical democracy and ideological nonviolence, wholeheartedly embracing the
former but arguing for more strategic flexibility with the latter, particularly in
regard to collective destruction of corporate property.’
Direct democracy is thus a core value for these activists.  The movement’s
flexible and fluid character is well captured by Mary King (2000:4) when she describes
Global Action:
‘Global Action is a loose constellation of organizations, affiliates, NGOs,
individuals, anarchists, religious and even government agents. The constitution
is shifting, ambiguous and fluid.  Individual membership may be routine or
occur only once at a particular action. Global Action has certain contact points
that only exist externally to others when it deems necessary to materialize.
Members don’t necessarily identify with all of the fractured causes but they do
relate to points along the spectrum of action (…) They are aligned with the
momentum. (…) They may have diverse backgrounds but share the same global
targets. They also have one more thing in common, a sense of earth citizenship
which transcends national boundaries’ 
Some authors (Aguiton 2003; Yuen 2002) underline the anti-globalization
movement’s ideological and organizational differences when compared to the social
struggles of the 1960’s. Its main targets are not state or governmental organizations,
rather it struggles against corporate capitalist symbols. Furthermore, there is little, if
any, political party influence. Mary King (2000: 5) summarizes this issue by saying that
diversity is the movement’s self-identity. She believes that ‘conflicts no longer dissolve
into ready made categories of division and they are less likely to be identified in terms
of class antagonisms, control over territory or nationalist aspirations. Rather, struggle
centers around the manipulation of information, knowledge, interpretation and
communication’ (2000: 6). What may underlie this diversity are the same engines that
fuelled post-modernist visions and metaphors of subject’s fragmented identities,
dissemination, deterritorialization and networks within the academic world in the
1990’s. I am referring to the ideological and utopian crisis opened up at the end of the
20th century by the collapse of really existing socialism, a discourse that, in one way or
another, used to galvanize most of the alternative discourses against capitalism. Older
alternative political movements had on their horizons, highly unifying political theories,
such as Marxism-Leninism, and categories such as class and revolution. They were also
able to rely on a political subject, the revolutionary proletariat, located in a structural
(op)position in a system clearly defined in terms of contradictory forces. This did not
mean, however, that such movements were homogenous.
The discussion on ‘new political subjects’ is marked by the need to identify a
collectivity prone to political change. It is surely related to the ideology and utopia crisis
I referred to but also to changes in the nature of ‘real public space’ brought about by the
flourishing of ‘virtual public space’ (Ribeiro 2003), a growth caused by new means of
communication, as well as by an increase in the circulation of difference provoked by
globalization processes. 
9As we know, the anti-globalization movement is to a large extent the coming of
age of trends inaugurated by the environmental movement in the late 1980’s and which
developed through the 90’s. Although sharing the same cause, the struggle against
exclusionary globalization processes, the movement is globally fragmented. All the
same its global articulation is strengthened by two virtual and globalizing agencies: the
media and the Internet. 
Awareness of the media’s importance in contemporary politics was inherited
from such political actors as Greenpeace, Earth First! and the Zapatistas. It led the anti-
globalization movement to value political action regarding the media and to look for
alternative media practices. Struggling for a critical planetary citizenship, the movement
is a particularly relevant constituent of the transnational virtual imagined community,
the symbolic basis of the global civil society propitiated by the diffusion of the Internet
as a means of interactive communication (Ribeiro 1998). Another pertinent aspect of the
movement’s effectiveness is related to invading the world system with alternative
mediascapes, with news that compete with information from global media corporations
and chains. This is why demonstrations and forums are held in situations where not only
global elites but the global media are present and perform a global media event. It is
never too much to stress the role that environmental activism has played in the trend:
from ‘think globally, act locally,’ to the awareness that the struggle against oppressive
racist and environmentally destructive globalization needs to be fought in the global-
fragmented spaces where transnational elites and managers perform their global
integration rituals. A sensitivity to the role of information was already present in the
Rio-1992 conference when the Internet was widely used to mobilize the transnational
virtual imagined community by means of the Association for Progressive
Communication’s work (idem). Faithful to this trend, the anti-globalization movement
has fostered the creation of Independent Media Centers worldwide. The first indymedia
was established by various independent and alternative media organizations and
activists in 1999 for the purpose of providing grassroots coverage of the WTO protests
in Seattle7. 
Street demonstrations may also be seen as communication devices. Their
purpose is to affirm the existence of a new political subject and to invade real and
virtual public space with alternative messages on globalization. Quantity and quality
play strategic roles in these scenarios. The size of the movement is a quantitative
measure of its power. The effectiveness of the alternative discourses can be measured
by its global visibility and dissemination, a proof of the quality of the movement’s
message. Diversity, closely related to quantity and quality, gives an idea of the
movement’s scope, complexity and representativeness. It is transclassist, transgender,
trans-ethnic, transnational, trans-ideological, trans-utopian and trans-behaviorial. Form
and organization are crucial because they show, in practice, a different collective
identity that is plural and combative. The global media’s attention is captured by the
costumes some activists wear, the carnival like atmosphere of some demonstrations, the
dramatization of parades and by the eminent and often real risk of violent street battles.
Attracting the media is a role especially well performed by punks and by the massive
display and use of repressive power. 
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The police are the most evident state representatives, expressions of local and
national levels of power at these demonstrations. City and federal authorities know that
the world is watching them. Street demonstrations as counter-hegemonic mega global
events are thus informed by the same triangle that structures other non-hegemonic
global events attracting worldwide attention: 1) the rich and powerful gather in
impressive scale 2) the alternative trans-national agents meet in impressive scale 3)
national and local authorities try to control their public spaces, in order to control the
mediascapes that are produced from their territories.
These demonstrations have occurred in different cities around the world and
gained media visibility at global and national levels. They have reinforced the idea that
another world is possible. This is, indeed, the motto of the World Social Forums. 
World Social Forums
The World Social Forums (WSF) are part of the same historical genealogy of
anti-globalization movements. In contrast to the anti-globalization street demonstrations
I consider them as examples of the alter-globalization struggle. Undoubtedly, anti-
globalization forces also participate in the WSF. However, some of the Forum’s most
influential organizers are agencies that clearly accept globalization as a historical fact
but aim at changing its quality. This is, for instance, the case with ATTAC, the
Association for (the) Taxation of Financial Transactions for Citizens’ Assistance,
founded in June 1998 by Le Monde Diplomatique, the French newspaper. At the
opening of the first World Social Forum, Bernard Cassen, general director of Le Monde
Diplomatique declared that ‘we are not against globalization, but we are critical of how
it is put into effect’ (O Estado de São Paulo, January 26, 2001). 
Box 1 – Attac’s self-definition
‘a network, with neither ‘hierarchical’ structures nor a geographical ‘center.’ Pluralist, it is enriched by the variety of
its components and makes common action easier without limiting it in any way, or dictating their freedom of
contribution. It aims to reinforce, to link and to coordinate, at an international level, the contribution of all its partners
who see themselves as fitting into the structure of its platform. In the same way, it wishes to reinforce its cooperation
with all other networks whose objectives converge with its own. It has over 80,000 members worldwide. It is an
international network of independent national and local groups in 33 countries. It promotes the idea of an
international tax on currency speculation (the Tobin Tax) and campaigns to outlaw tax havens, replace pension funds
with state pensions, cancel Third World debt, reform or abolish the World Trade Organization (WTO) and, more
generally, regain democratic space that has been lost to the financial world. ATTAC combines activism with
intellectual creativity. It promotes practical economic reforms meant to tame the devastating power of financial
markets, and to favor democratic, transparent economic structures that serve ordinary people’s needs. It looks for
alternatives to the dogmatic ideology of neoliberalism. ATTAC is independent from all political parties, and brings
together labor unions, associations, MPs, academics and citizens from all walks of life, in self-education and peaceful
action. ATTAC took part in the demonstrations at Seattle in 1999 against the WTO, and at Genoa in July 2001
against the G8. It is part of a diverse global movement that promotes democratic self-determination for local and
regional economies’ (http:// attac.org.uk/attac/html/index.vm, accessed on January 16, 2005). 
In early 2000, ‘under the impact’ of the 1999 Seattle battle, a World Social
Forum that would take place simultaneously with the World Economic Forum started to
be thought out (Seoane and Taddei 2001: 106):
‘A collective of Brazilian social movements and organizations accepted the
challenge with support from Le Monde Diplomatique (…) The city of Porto
Alegre, with its experience in democratic management came to the spotlight
through its unprecedented experience in participatory budgeting promoted by the
city’s leftist government headed by the Workers’ Party (PT). It earned approval
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from promoters of the idea that it was the most appropriate place for the WSF to
take place. With enthusiastic support from the Rio do Grande do Sul state [also
governed by the Workers’ Party, GLR], support that lasted during the Forum, …
the call was unanimously endorsed at the June 2000 meetings of the Parallel
Social Summit, a gathering parallel to a meeting organized by the United
Nations in Geneva, Switzerland’ (idem).
 
From the onset, the World Social Forum was considered as a counterpoint to the
World Economic Forum, in Davos, Switzerland, widely conceived as the meeting where
the hegemonic neoliberal global elite convenes. The first World Social Forum was held
at the Pontifical Catholic University in Porto Alegre, between 25th and 30th January,
2001. According to the organizers, there were more than 15,000 participants with 4,702
being delegates from 117 countries; 104 panelists and expositors (27 Brazilians and 69
from other countries); 165 special guests from 36 countries (77 Brazilians, 88 from
other countries). Two thousand young people and 700 Indians camped in the Harmony
Park. One thousand eight hundred and seventy accredited journalists –1,484 Brazilians,
386 from other countries -- disseminated the news about WSF. There was a fair of
social movements, publishing houses, NGOs, with 65 exhibitors and 325 accredited
persons. Simultaneous translations of the panels were conducted by 51 translators
(Seoane and Taddei 2001: 127-128). 
In the mornings there were 4 simultaneous conferences restricted to ‘registered
delegates, representatives from organizations around the world’ (WSF 2001: 7). The
conferences were broadcast over cable TV, Internet and could also be seen by non-
delegates in a public auditorium downtown Porto Alegre. They were organized around 4
main themes: the production of wealth and social reproduction; access to welfare and
sustainability; the affirmation of civil society and public spaces; political power and
ethics in the new society. Scheduled lecturers were well known activists, unionists,
scholars or politicians such as Samir Amin, Walden Bello (professor, University of the
Philippines), Bernard Cassen (director of Le Monde Diplomatique), Oded Grajew
(president of Ethos Institute, Brazil), Yoko Kitazawa (president of Jubileo 2000-Japan);
Marina Silva (Senator, Brazil); Fray Beto (Brazil); Park Hasson (representing the union
KCTU, South Korea); Thimothy Ney (representing the Free Software Foundation);
Boaventura de Souza Santos (professor, University of Coimbra);  Tariq Ali (Pakistan);
Armand Mattelar (Belgium); Aminata Traoré (former Minister of Culture, Mali);
Ahmed Ben Bella (Algeria); Kirstem Maller (Director, Global Exchange); Anibal
Quijano (professor University of San Marcos, Peru); Ricardo Alarcón (president of
Cuba’s parliament), and many others. 
In the afternoon, there were ‘workshops’ organized by institutions participating
in the Forum. The general public could have access to almost all of the workshops on a
first come first served basis. A myriad number of subjects was discussed but most
revolved around issues concerning labor practices and unionism, the environment,
agrarian reform, development, health, education, pacifism, human rights, racial/ethnic
relations, cultural politics, social and political democracy, citizenship, media and
communication, social movements, social justice, global geopolitics, global civil
society, transnational activism and resistance against neoliberal globalization.
Workshop organizers were mainly Brazilian NGOs, unions and scholars, followed, in
number by their peers from Latin America, Europe (especially from Italy and France)
and the United States. Some organizations from the state of Rio Grande do Sul and the
city of Porto Alegre as well as from the Brazilian Catholic church were also active.
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There was a cultural program that included dance, theater and music presented almost
exclusively by Brazilian artists at different points in Porto Alegre.
As with many other rituals, the WSF starts and ends with special ceremonies that
inaugurate and close a period of ritual activities, a period of communitas to use Victor
Turner’s (1969) well-known notion. For instance, in the 2003 edition of the WSF,  held
a few months before the Iraq war, the ‘March of Diversity Against the War’ started the
6 day-long event and had as its motto the ‘construction of another world is possible
against militarization and war’ (WSF 2003: 4). The ‘March of Diversity Against the
War’ set out from the Intercontinental Youth Camp and went to a square in downtown
Porto Alegre where there was a ‘concentration of drums and voices for peace’. The
Program for that year’s Forum invited ‘all to take their percussion instruments and flags
of their regions, countries and movements. After the march, Intercontinental Youth
Camp representatives will collect the greatest number of pennants they can to create at
the end of the WSF the Flag of Flags which will be one of the symbols of
multiculturality’ (idem). The third World Social Forum ended with a party thrown at the
Sunset Amphitheater by the Guaíba river. 
Box 2 – WSF’s Self - definition
The World Social Forum is an open meeting at which civil society groups and movements opposed to neo-liberalism
and a world dominated by capitalism or by any form of imperialism, but engaged in building a planetary society
centered on the human person, come together to pursue their thinking, to debate ideas democratically, formulate
proposals, share their experiences freely and engage in networking for effective action (…). The WSF aims to debate
alternative means to building globalization in solidarity that respects universal human rights and those of all men and
women of all nations as well as the environment’s, and is grounded in democratic international systems and
institutions at the service of social justice, equality and the sovereignty of peoples
http://www.forumsocialmundial.org.br/main.php?id_menu=19&cd_language=2 , accessed on January 16, 2005.
The World Social Forums grew tenfold in five years, from the 15,000
participants in 2001 to the 155,000 who went to Porto Alegre in 2005 (Correio
Braziliense, February 1, 2005). Four editions were held in Porto Alegre, another, in
2004, in Mumbai, India. The Forum’s organizational structure has varied a little over
these years. Its growing importance has prompted an increased formalization in its
political structure. A Charter of Principles was drafted and an International Council
created to ‘make the WSF’s articulation process viable on the international level’
(www.forumsocialmundial.org.br). The Council, a ‘political and operational body,’ is
made up ‘of thematic networks, movements and organizations that have accumulated
knowledge and experience in the search for alternatives to neoliberal globalization’
(idem; see annex 1).
In comparison with street demonstrations, World Social Forums are alter-
globalization mega events that are highly structured, institutionalized and hierarchical.
They are mega global integration rituals of transnational alter-native political elites with
a basic two-layered structure. First, there are the open, ‘self-managed’ activities, a set of
more horizontal communicative encounters. These usually are hundreds of workshops,
seminars, courses, meetings and other initiatives proposed by NGOs, unions, social
movements, churches, etc. They represent smaller rituals in which segments of the
transnational imagined virtual community that share specific interests meet and interact
in real public space. Some of these are transnational activists that may have been in
touch with others from different countries through the virtual public space provided by
the Internet. They are often meeting face-to-face for the first time. Secondly, there are
the Panels, Conferences, Testimonies and Round Tables of Dialogue and Controversies
where the political and intellectual elite of the anti/alter-globalization movements
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perform their roles as global leaders and acquire more prestige and power. These are
highly structured encounters and their participants defined by powerful members of the
WSF organization. In 2005, the International Council, was responsible for these
definitions. 
All meetings are to produce proposals to guide the movement’s political action.
In order to democratize the wider public’s access to proposals, organizers set up a Great
Wall of Action where these proposals are to be posted. The 2003 program announced: 
‘all actions and issues will be considered, those proposed by a small or a large
number of movements or organizations. There will be room for all proposals on
the Wall. The Wall of Proposals will make clear that the Forum goes beyond the
analysis and discussion of Neoliberalism. Delegates to the Forum are essentially
people already engaged in the struggle for a new world so that they exchange
experiences during the event, learn with others, reflect profoundly and articulate
their perspectives nationally and internationally. Once the Forum has come to an
end, they go back to their actions with more knowledge, alliances, projects and
energy to continue the struggle” (WSF 2003: 18).
However, the conferences and other events with the leaders and ideologues of
the anti/alter-globalization movement are examples of a hierarchical structure in place.
These encounters present a political and age cleavage often perceived by young
participants as a dividing power line and as an indication of the World Social Forum’s
elitist character. The invitation of celebrities is a standing policy. In 2005, José
Saramago, Manuel Castells, among many other intellectuals, were at a Forum that also
included participation from Luis Inácio Lula da Silva, the president of Brazil, and Hugo
Chávez, the president of Venezuela.
Indeed, the World Forums have become a polinucleated power field (on this
notion see Barros 2005) in itself, one where, in spite of the idiom of decentering and
horizontality, there are several agents and agencies who have more power than others in
the structuring of the ritual as well as more access to the power the ritual produces. This
is reflected, for instance, in the composition of the 2003 Organization Committee made
up of a few of the largest Brazilian NGO’s; a powerful union confederation; the
Landless Movement, the most powerful Brazilian social movement; and the Catholic
Church.8 In 2004, when the Forum was organized in India, the event also reflected this
country’s civil society’s political and social structure (see annex 2). Organizers were
divided into 4 categories: The India General Council (the decision-making body for the
WSF India process); The India Work Committee (responsible for formulating policy
guidelines that formed the basis for the functioning of the WSF India process); The
India Organizing Committee (the WSF’s executive body); and the Mumbai Organizing
Committee. On the Indian Working Committee, for instance, there were sizable
representations of Dalits, the caste also known as the untouchables, and Advasis, a
general term that is used to refer to the ‘tribal societies’,  distinct from Hindu society.   
                                                
8 The 2003 Organizing Committee was made up of  ABONG (Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não
Governamentais), ATTAC (Ação pela Tributação das Transações Financeiras em Apoio aos Cidadãos),
CBPJ (Comissão Brasileira  Justiça e Paz- CNBB), CIVES (Ação Brasileira de Empresários pela
Cidadania), CUT (Central Única dos Trabalhadores), IBASE (Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e
Econômicas), MST (Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais sem Terra) and Rede Social de Justiça e
Direitos Humanos.
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The tensions between anti and alter globalization forces have been clearly
expressed since the first Forum. The Landless Movement, for instance, criticized the
‘light left’ -- the NGOs, the Workers’ Party and Le Monde Diplomatique -- that
organized the event (Folha de São Paulo, January 26, 2001, A8). Contrary to the
organizers’ orientations, a group of 40 punks and anarchists threatened to invade a
McDonald’s restaurant (idem). Landless Movement Activists ‘invaded experimental
plantations of the Monsanto transnational corporation’ to protest transgenic food and to
defend small-scale farming. José Bové, the French anti-globalization leader, later joined
the MST in another demonstration against Monsanto. On the Organizing Committee
only a few organizations have relations with popular movements. In 2001, for instance,
out of 8 members only 2, CUT and MST, had such connections. Indeed, the Organizing
Committee is made up mostly of NGOs ‘dominated by intellectuals and similar sectors
from the middle classes’ (Barros e Silva 2001: A8). Given their reliance on city and
state government support, organizers wanted to avoid any kind of confrontation that
could get out of control. The absence of street fights with the police points to the
importance of alliances with state apparatuses and to the alter-globalization movement’s
reformist character. Ignacio Ramonet, director of Le Monde Diplomatique, wrote in his
newspaper that the Forum exists ‘not to protest, like in Seattle, Washington, Prague and
other places, against injustices, inequalities and disasters provoked almost everywhere
by the excesses of Neoliberalism, but to try, this time in a positive and constructive
manner, to propose a theoretical and practical framework that envisages a new kind of
globalization in which another world, less inhumane and more cooperative, is possible’
(Barros e Silva 2001: A14).9
A survey carried out at the 2004 Forum in India with 3.5 thousand participants
indicated that 63% had university degrees (Jornal do Brasil, January 17, 2005). During
preparations for the 2005 Forum, the Organizing Committee admitted to the Forum’s
‘elitist’ character. The chair of IBASE, one of the most influential NGOs among the
organizers, said that major activities, such as conferences and panels, previously defined
by the International Committee, were defined for the 2005 meeting through ample
consultation made via the Internet. He added:
‘- We are the elite of the organizations and social movements. If people don’t
have the money to go to the forum, the forum will have to go to the people’
(idem).
Consequently, the Forum moved out of the Pontifical Catholic University that
was ‘too closely associated with a space for the elite.’ In order to encourage slum
dwellers’ participation, organizers planned to serve them 20,000 meals per day. They
also stopped paying for VIP trips that used up around US$ 500 thousand. Part of this
money was destined to bring representatives of native peoples from North and South
America, Pakistanis and Indians, as well as to subsidize buses traveling to Porto Alegre
from all Brazilian state capitals (idem).
The WSF is a power magnet. This becomes evident during the political
processes that precede the annual event and in the attraction the Forum exerts over
political actors. Major political actors from the progressist camp want to have their
                                                
9 O Fórum existe ‘não para protestar, como em Seattle, Washington, Praga e outros lugares, contra as
injustiças, as desigualdades e os desastres que provocam, um pouco por toda a parte, os excessos de
neoliberalismo. Mas para tentar, desta vez com espírito positivo e construtivo, propor um quadro teórico e
prático que permita vislumbrar uma mundialização de tipo novo, que afirme que um outro mundo, menos
desumano e mais solidário é possível’.
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presence spotlighted at the Forum. It is especially important if their participation is
publicized by the media. From the current president of Brazil, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva,
who has been to all WSFs held in Brazil, to superstars from the academic and artistic
worlds, many want to be seen at this global media event. Rituals are effective
communication devices not only for those who participate in them but also for those
who, thanks to different media, are informed of or may follow their unfolding.
As a mega global ritual of integration the WSF brings together different agents
anchored in different levels of social agency. There are the local agents represented by
the municipality of Porto Alegre, the local universities, intellectuals, politicians and
civil society members. Agents acting at the regional level are also very much present
either through the Rio Grande do Sul state government’s pro-active involvement, this
state’s capital being Porto Alegre, or through the presence of other actors from Brazil’s
southern region or even from Uruguay and some provinces of Argentina that have
historically and culturally been part of a same international region. The presence of
national agents and agencies is noticeable in the involvement of several national NGOs,
union confederations, churches, political parties, federal government organizations, etc.
International and transnational agents should be expected at a mega global event and
this indeed is the case. National and ethnic diversity is a key characteristic of the World
Social Forums. For, ever since the first forum, participants came from more than 117
countries. In events that are often compared to Babel, translators, many of them
volunteers, abound. NGO’s, transnational activists, international foundations are, to a
great extent, the reason for the WSF’s existence. The plurality of actors located at
different levels of integration, with different political, social and cultural reach, is the
Forums’ greatest political capital.  In reality, the Forums have been major opportunities
for networking in real public space within the non-hegemonic globalization movement.
As scenarios where the transnational virtual imagined community may meet outside of
cyberspace, the Forums play an important role in the making of a global civil society. 
Seoane and Taddei (2001: 106) indicated that city and state politics were
instrumental in the organization of the first WSF. Indeed, it was sponsored by the Rio
Grande do Sul State Energy Company and the Rio Grande do Sul State Bank.  In fact,
Rio Grande do Sul is a state that has been run by the Workers’ Party for many years.
Further, the city of Porto Alegre, also administered by the Workers’ Party, lent its
support together with the Pontifical Catholic University and the Federal University of
Rio Grande do Sul as well as the Government of the State as a whole.  The Forum’s
growth and political visibility, propitiated by an increasing concentration of alter-native
transnational elites, drew attention from powerful sponsors and supporters. For instance,
state-controlled Petrobras, Brazil’s oil company and one of the largest corporations in
the country, joined the city of Porto Alegre and the state of Rio Grande do Sul in 2003,
one year after the start of the Workers’ Party federal administration. In 2005, Petrobras
was joined by other ‘sponsors and supporters’ among them the Banco do Brasil,
Brazil’s largest half state-owned bank, Caixa Econômica Federal, another powerful state
bank and other powerful state-controlled corporations such as Eletrobrás, Infraero and
Furnas. Besides these Brazilian governmental organizations, WSF 2005 has received
support from some large international cooperation agencies, almost all backed by
Catholic or Protestant churches: eed-Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (Church
Development Services, an organization of Protestant churches in Germany), Christian
Aid (an agency of churches in the UK and Ireland), CCFD (Comité Catholique contre la
Faim et pour le Développement, France), n(o)vib (Oxfam, Holanda), CAFOD (Catholic
Agencies for Overseas Development, a British organization), Rockfeller Brothers Fund
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(U.S.), Misereor (the German Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Cooperation and
Development).10
The costs of the first WSF amounted to approximately R$ 2 million, of which 1
million was paid by the Rio Grande do Sul state government and R$ 300 thousand by
the city of Porto Alegre. The remaining balance was paid by NGOs (Folha de São
Paulo, January 26, 2001, p. A7). In 2001, the use of public funds was already an issue.11
In fact, increased allotment of public funding led WSF critics to state that Brazilian
taxpayers are sponsoring meetings of people who ‘defend dogmatic ideas that reject
freedom’ (Rosenfield 2005: A3). According to this professor of political philosophy at
the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, ten million (approximately US$ 3.7
million) out of the R$ 14.5 million (approximately US$ 5.4 million) spent on the 2005
Forum came from public sources12. 
The World Social Forum was planned to be the counterpoint of the World Economic
Forum, in Davos, a meeting that has been organized since 1971 by a Swiss foundation which is
also a consultant for the United Nations. Financed by more than one thousand multinational
corporations, the World Economic Forum was designed to bring together the global political and
corporate hegemonic elite. It has been described as ‘a gathering of political and business movers
and shakers from all over the world. The meetings and smaller forums in Africa, Asia, South
America and elsewhere throughout the year have become powerful attractions, with hundreds of
business leaders paying $20,000 per company to come to Davos to hobnob. To many critics,
Davos, with its closed-door meetings of executives pursuing contracts and contacts with top
politicians and pundits, symbolize the new economic orthodoxy of the late 20th century’ (Whitney
1997). Companies present at the 1997 conference represented an estimated US$ 4.5 trillion a year
of business, an amount powerful enough to attract celebrities ranging from Bill Gates, Microsoft
chairman, to Yasir Arafat, the Palestinian leader (idem). In 2001, approximately 3.000
participants gathered in Davos, among them Jacob Frenkel (CEO, Merril Lynch), Alan Blinder
(former vice-president of the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank; professor of economics at Princeton
University), James Wolfensohn (President, World Bank), John Sweeney (chair, AFL-CIO),
Charles Holliday (World Chairman, DuPont), Carleton Fiorina (chair, Hewlett Packard), Henry
Paulson Jr. (CEO, Goldman Sachs), George Soros (mega global investor), Vandana Shiva
(global environmentalist leader). Since reverberations from the 1999 Seattle battle were still in
the air and 2001 was the year of the first World Social Forum, poverty was a subject considered
by several participants who also recognized the importance of the anti/alter globalization
movement (Gosman 2001). 
The novelty of counter-hegemonic global activism certainly contributed to the initiative
for organizing an international teleconference among representatives of the two forums gathered
on both sides of the Atlantic, in the global North and in the global South. The teleconference did
take place in January 28, 2001 (see Correio Braziliense, January 29, 2001, p. 3).  In Porto
Alegre, 11 World Social Forum representatives, among them Aminata Traore (former minister
of culture of Mali), Bernard Cassen (ATTAC/Le Monde Diplomatique), Walden Bello
(professor of sociology in the Philippines), Hebe de Bonafini (Mothers of the Plaza de Mayo,
                                                
10 Annex 3 lists the WSFs’ sponsors and supporters.  
11 ‘Student centers at universities in Rio Grande do Sul protested in front of the seat of the WSF against
public financing of the event. Demonstrators booed governor Olívio Dutra (Workers’ Party) when he
arrived at the Forum. Through leaflet distribution, students stated they wanted public funds for student
loans, research and the founding of a public state university, one of Olívio’s campaign promises’ (Folha
de São Paulo, January 26, 2001, p. A7). ‘Diretórios acadêmicos de universidades gaúchas fizeram um
protesto, em frente à PUC-RS (onde ocorre a maioria dos eventos do Fórum Social Mundial), contra o uso
de dinheiro público no evento. Os manifestantes vaiaram o governador Olívio Dutra (PT) quando ele
chegava ao fórum. Em panfleto, os estudantes disseram querer recursos para crédito educativo, pesquisas
e para a criação de uma universidade estadual pública (promessa de campanha de Olívio)’.
12  One American dollar was worth  R$ 2.69, Brazil’s local currency, in January 21, 2005.
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Buenos Aires), and the leader of a peasant movement from Honduras, Raphael Alegria, gathered
in an auditorium at the Pontifical Catholic University. In Davos, George Soros (mega investor),
John Ruggie (chief United Nations counselor), Mark Malloch (head of the United Nations
Development Program), and Bjorg Edlud (president of the multinational corporation ABB),
gathered in a Protestant church. The one and a half hour long debate was broadcast by the Rio
Grande do Sul state’s public Education Channel and watched by a lively crowd of 1,800 people
in an auditorium at the Catholic university. It was a harsh exchange that was interrupted when
Soros proposed the end of the conversation when Hebe Bonafini, after a heated intervention,
asked him whether he knew how many children died of hunger a day in the world.
This teleconference cannot be considered as an encounter with the sole function
of reinforcing each side’s social and political identity. It is a clear indication of the
awareness that each side has of the importance of drawing the global media’s attention.
Davos, for its own spectacular concentration of rich and powerful people, has enjoyed
for many years a lot of media attention. However, this was not the case with the Porto
Alegre meeting. It is not an exaggeration to say that one of the WSF’s main goals, and,
for that matter, the anti/alter-globalization movement’s, is to disseminate other
mediascapes about globalization. Part of the strategic effort to couple events such as the
forums and the street demonstrations with major gatherings of the global establishment
relates to the visibility needs of a movement that understands well the value of
circulating other messages within the global media. In addition to their importance as
rituals of integration, the WSFs also play a crucial role in generating alternative images
and discourses in global circuits so as to reach a much larger and general audience.
They are thus opportunities for consolidating and diffusing political, ideological and
utopian matrices as well as for articulating networks of action within a still small
counter-hegemonic global elite. Non-hegemonic global political elites’ integration
rituals are central in the weaving of networks of transnational activists and agents in real
public space. 
Conclusions about political non-hegemonic movements
The anti/alter-globalization movement’s diversity is a characteristic that is much
emphasized and seen as a novelty by many. Indeed, years ago, it would have been
greatly unexpected to see peasant or Indian leaders together with punks at the same
protest. Nevertheless we should not forget that diversity was also present in the
environmentalist movement and much before in the socialist movement. The First
Socialist International was held in 1864 and was made up, for instance, of delegates
from at least three countries, England, France and Germany (see Riazanov [1926]
2004). With the heightening of globalization, especially with the increase in time-space
compression, today we should expect a greater diversity at such international counter-
hegemonic events. There are two factors underlying surprise about the current anti/alter-
globalization movement’s internal diversity. First, there is a misunderstanding that
implies a simplification of the nature of collective political subjects. The fact that a
collectivity represents itself or is represented by the same movement and is willing to
reach similar goals does not mean it is not divided by contradictory forces or that it is
homogeneously composed. Secondly, there is a conjunctural element related to the
discursive crisis opened up by the end of really existing socialism and the loss of its
ideological and utopian perspectives’ effectiveness. What was earlier considered as the
left is now the focus of debate, an object in flux. Indeed, what the movement’s diversity
indicates is the effectiveness of progressive contemporary networking both in real and
virtual public spaces.
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Both the street demonstrations and the WSFs keep the same ‘structure versus
anti-structure’ strategy. It is a rather powerful strategy since it is a way of invading the
global media with alternative images and messages allowing for ‘witnessing at a
distance,’ one of the forces behind transnational imagined virtual community structuring
(Ribeiro 1998). Finally, it should be noted that the anti-alter-globalization movement’s
heterodox diversity does not mean that members of traditional leftist currents are not
members or leaders of this transnational movement. On the contrary, there can be found
a certain continuity between an old, socialist inspired left and this new global
movement.
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Economic non-hegemonic globalization: The Foz do Iguaçu/Ciudad del Este
transfrontier and the Paraguayan fair in Brasilia  
The most visible actors in non-hegemonic economic globalization, street
vendors of global gadgets, for instance, are but the tip of the iceberg, in a huge parallel
global economy. I call it non-hegemonic globalization not because its agents intend to
destroy global capitalism or to install some kind of radical alternative to the prevailing
order. They are non-hegemonic because their activities defy the economic establishment
everywhere on the local, regional, national, international and transnational levels.
Consequently, they are portrayed as a threat to the establishment and feel the power of
political and economic elites who wish to control them. The attitudes states and
corporations hold towards them are highly revealing. Most of the time such activities
are treated as police matters, as the focus of elaborate repressive action. Non-hegemonic
economic globalization is a huge universe that does involve illegal activities, such as
human and organ smuggling, that need to be repressed. They undoubtedly involve drug-
trafficking too. All the same, workers, such as street vendors, whose ‘crime’ is to work
outside of the parameters defined by the state are an expressive part of non-hegemonic
globalization. It is not my intention to glamorize criminality. However, I want to
distance myself from a discussion that is basically state-centric or, in the best cases, has
been strongly circumscribed by state norms and regulations, by definitions of what is
legal and illegal, often reflecting the history of power relationships among differentiated
social segments and classes (for an interesting book on related issues see Heyman
1999). In constructing another angle, I am seriously taking into account one of
anthropology’s most powerful assets: the consideration of the agent’s points-of-view.
Non-hegemonic economic globalization is structured by diverse types of
segments and networks that congeal in a pyramidal fashion. At the top there are money-
laundering schemes, Mafia like activities, all sorts of corruption. However powerful and
elitist many of the agents involved in the parallel global economy may be, they cannot
act on their own. There is massive involvement from poor people in the lower segments
of this pyramidal structure. For these social actors, non-hegemonic globalization is a
way of making a living or of upward social mobility. Networking and brokerage cement
this global structure in ways that are comparable to what I have called consortiation,  a
process that is typical of articulations among transnational, national, regional and local
agents around multi-billion large-scale infrastructure projects (Ribeiro 1994, 2002). The
activities at the bottom of this pyramid are what I call grassroots economic
globalization, a real globalization from below. They provide access to flows of global
wealth that otherwise would never reach the more vulnerable ranks of any society or
economy. They either open an avenue for upward mobility or the possibility of survival
in national and global economies that are not capable to provide full employment for all
citizens. I am thus more interested in this segment of the non-hegemonic economic
globalization than in its upper echelons. 
In the following pages, I will describe the activities of non-hegemonic economic
globalization as practiced in the ‘social transfrontier space’ formed by the Brazilian city
of Foz do Iguaçu and the Paraguayan Ciudad del Este.  Subsequently I will describe one
of the largest and most controversial global gadgets markets within Brazil, the so-called
Paraguay Market in Brasília, the country’s federal city.
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Ciudad del Este/Foz do Iguaçu: social transfrontier as global fragmented space
The 3,940km-long Paraná river in South America is second only to the Amazon.
It is also where the most known South-American borders are located. The so-called Tri-
Country Border area has frontiers that separate Argentina, Brazil and Paraguay (see map
1). In this area, there are three cities, located in each country, that make up an
international urban system linked by two international bridges. Foz do Iguaçu is a
Brazilian city linked to the Argentinian Puerto Iguazu through the Tancredo Neves
bridge (opened in 1985), and to the Paraguayan Ciudad del Este through the Ponte da
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Source: Rabossi (2004: 309).
The famous Iguaçu Falls, one of the world’s largest waterfalls, are located in the
same area on the Iguaçu river on the Brazil-Argentina border. They attract thousands of
tourists to Puerto Iguazu (Argentina) and to Foz do Iguaçu (Brazil). Besides global and
national tourism there are other globalizing forces that have given the area its particular
characteristics. One of them the Tri-country Border Area shares with many other
borders around the world: smuggling has existed in the area since colonial times
(Grimson 2003). The other was the construction in the 1970’s and 80’s of a binational
Brazilian-Paraguayan ‘development project,’ Itaipu, the second largest hydroelectric
dam in the world. The Itaipu’s construction was a major happening of hegemonic
globalization for it brought together impressive amounts of labor, technology,
transnational capital and elites, and meant rapid population growth especially for the
cities of Foz do Iguaçu and Ciudad del Este. Finally, the environmental movement has
put the area’s tropical forests in the global green map and the U.S. imperial security




The notion of ‘social transfrontier space’ (Jimenez Marcano 1996) is useful in
contemplating the particular relationships that develop in places such as the Tri-border
Area. It allows for an understanding of the social, cultural, economic, political and
kinship relations social agents develop in border areas where the frontier line operates
as a complex and rather flexible taxonomic device. States, their apparatuses, agencies
and agents, are territorial entities that strive to control the areas under their jurisdiction.
Much of the flexibility social agents experience in border zones is related to the
inefficiency of state agents or to their connivance with other social agents operating
within the confines of the transfrontier space. This notion also allows for the perception
of different kinds of agents operating in a given space that necessarily transcends the
control imposed by states. It is impossible to define where a social transfrontier space
physically ends, especially because it is not created and managed by formal institutions.
Since social transfrontier spaces traverse the classificatory logics of national states, the
largest transfrontier spaces are often transnational realms prone to be global fragmented
spaces linked to global circuits of people, goods and information. This is indeed the
case with the Tri-country Border Area. 
In spite of Puerto Iguazu’s importance in the tri-border area, especially in
relation to domestic and international tourists that visit the Iguazu National Park and the
waterfalls in Argentina (Mendonça 2002), the main social transfrontier space in that
area is structured by the relationships between Ciudad del Este, in Paraguay, and Foz do
Iguaçu, in Brazil. These two cities comprise a same field of relationships whose growth
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and complexity have become more accentuated in the last two or three decades. The two
cities together are an important financial center and a major global trading center. They
are also an ethnically segmented unit. Besides Paraguayans and Brazilians, in this social
transfrontier space there is the presence of Arabs (especially from Syria and Lebanon;
among them there are Christians and Muslims), Chinese and other less numerous ethnic
groups. 
My arguments will be based principally on research carried out by Fernando
Rabossi (2004) and César Pérez Ortiz (2004) on Ciudad del Este. This option is
consistent with the central role Ciudad del Este plays in attracting thousands of
Brazilians that visit the city daily to buy imported goods and sell them in their home
cities. These people sometimes travel more than 3,000 kilometers, they are veritable
nomadic merchants, people that are always traveling between their hometowns and
Ciudad del Este. In Portuguese they are called sacoleiros, literally ‘baggers,’ a reference
to the many bags they carry back home full of gadgets and counterfeits which are sold
in many street markets sometimes called Paraguayan markets. Brazilian ‘baggers’ are an
example of economic practices that are current worldwide and are part of what I call
non-hegemonic economic globalization or economic globalization from below (on
Bulgarian trader-tourists see Konstantinov 1996, on the importance of the global
counterfeit industry, especially in East Asia, see Chang 2004). In this sense, these
traders are alter-native transnational agents. 
States and major corporations everywhere, view these activities as illegal, a
danger to national and global economies. Interestingly enough, these social agents and
their activities are seldom taken into account in academic literature. Without a doubt,
they have been relegated to studies that are often labeled with negative denominations
as ‘shadow economy.’ Terms such as ‘smuggling’ and ‘piracy’, used to refer to these
activities and social agents, reveal an ancient drive to control their activity since they
mean ‘unfair competition’ for traders and corporations and a major problem for tax-
hungry states. The more neutral label ‘informal economy’ seems to forget a crucial
issue, that is, the definition of formality or informality is necessarily traversed by power
relations. In the following pages, I will describe the activities of this ‘global informal
economy’ as it is observable in Ciudad del Este and in one of the largest and most
controversial Paraguayan Markets within Brazil, the one located in this country’s
Federal District, Brasília.
Ciudad del Este: a global fragmented space
Ciudad del Este is the second most important city in Paraguay, after the capital
Asunción. Located on the banks of the Paraná River in front of the Brazilian Foz do
Iguaçu, from its beginning in 1957 the city’s fate was tied to its role as a gateway to
Brazilian harbors through roads that cut through the Brazilian state of Paraná, reaching
the Atlantic Ocean. This more than 730km long corridor within Brazilian territory was
to save landlocked Paraguay time and money. It also represented a geopolitical
alternative to the river connection to the Atlantic through the Paraguay, Paraná and La
Plata Rivers, heavily dominated by Argentina. Construction of the Friendship Bridge,
financed by the Brazilian state, began in the mid 1950’s. The bridge was opened only in
1965. 
Several measures were taken by the Paraguayan government to facilitate
drawing tourists to Ciudad del Este. The qualitative transformation of the city’s
economy occurred intensively during the 1980’s with the increase in the numbers of
Brazilian ‘shopping tourists’ who regularly visited Ciudad del Este, by then a city
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considered to be the largest shopping discount center in South America. Indeed, Ciudad
del Este has grown to be one of the world’s major trading centers through the re-export
of goods. Trader-tourists are attracted by the cheap prices on electronics and computer
goods, global gadgets, counterfeits and other commodities, such as imported perfumes,
clothes and alcoholic beverages. Many of these are expensive global status symbols.
The middle classes often cannot not afford to buy original brand products and end up
buying fake copies abundantly found in the streets and stores of Ciudad del Este.
Paraguay, especially Ciudad del Este, is internationally accused of being a major piracy
and smuggling center, a situation that is to a great extent sustained by the Paraguayan
state’s ambivalent position. On the one hand, it is difficult to effectively control this
global informal economy’s operations since part of the Paraguayan elite has been
historically involved with it and corruption is rampant in both sides of the border. On
the other hand, the state lacks the adequate infrastructure to control what is a huge and
complex arrangement of numerous and powerful networks, many of which go beyond
Paraguay’s national territory. A similar situation exists on the Brazilian side. The major
importance of Foz do Iguaçu as a money laundering center has been denounced many
times by the Brazilian press and was the focus of a major investigation by Brazil’s
national congress in 2004. 
To understand the development of Ciudad del Este into a major center of the
grassroots global economy we need to take into consideration Brazilian legislation
regarding the entry of imported goods to the country. All Brazilians traveling abroad
and re-entering the country through a land border have to go through customs and can
carry only US$ 150.00 quota of tax-free imported goods, an allowance valid for a
month. This is why thousands of Brazilians and Paraguayans are constantly going to
and from between the two cities. These people comprise the so-called ‘ant contraband,’
a mode of trying to evade customs control officials, unable to check all persons or
vehicles coming into Brazil. Moreover, many of these officials are also involved in
corruption.
Ciudad del Este is often cited as the third largest commercial city in the world,
after Miami and Hong Kong (Rabossi 2004: 7). Ciudad del Este’s economic force
impacts upon a vast area of South America, including Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Chile
and other Andean countries such as Bolivia. In Brazil, trader-tourists come as far away
as from Recife and Fortaleza, two cities located more than 3,500km away in the
Northeast of the country (on trader-tourists from Porto Alegre see Machado 2005).
Different sources quote highly variable estimates of Ciudad del Este’s annual trading:
from US$ 2.5 billion to US$ 15billion (idem). Whatever the real size of Ciudad del
Este’s economic power, it is not reflected in the city’s architecture or in its public
services. If it were not for its hectic trading activities, for a few fancy shopping-centers
and for the many foreigners who visit it, Ciudad del Este would resemble any other poor
town in the region. Its downtown, where most of the trading activities are conducted, is
strategically located near the Friendship Bridge and, in 2001, concentrated some 1,750
stores (Rabossi 2004: 39).13 There can be found fancy shopping centers, many stores,
small shops and also thousands of street vendors and other workers in the grassroots
globalization segment of the global economy. The streets are full of people conducting
all kinds of transactions: exchanging currencies, selling food, beverages, global gadgets,
or attracting new clients to established businesses. Many of the social agents working in
                                                
13 In 1994-1995, the best moments ever for the city’s economic activities, there were more than 6,000
stores in the same area (Rabossi 2004: 62).
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the transfrontier market, as in most trading activities, are brokers that make a living
from the difference between what they buy and what they sell. 
The major concentration of economic power, embedded in a political and social
situation in which corruption has proliferated, represents fertile ground for a series of
negative stereotypes to sprout about the city (Pérez Ortiz 2004). Ciudad del Este is often
called the home of South American drug cartels, Chinese Triadas, Japanese Yakuza,
Italian gangsters, Russian gangsters, Nigerian and Hezbollah terrorists. A darker tone
was to be added to the city’s image, after September 11th, 2001. Since the Three
Frontiers are home to thousands of Arab migrants and descendants, the area became a
hot spot for the new North-American geopolitics, as it was suspected of being a haven
for Muslim terrorists (see Ferradas 2004). Social transfrontiers are often seen as spaces
out of state control and, as a result, are negatively valued by authorities and the media as
zones prone to illegal activities. Such spaces, thus, can easily be manipulated by
different political and economic interests since they are liminal zones, hybrids that mix
people, things and information from many different national origins, and reveal nation-
states’ fragilities. 
Ciudad del Este and Foz do Iguaçu comprise an ethnically segmented labor
market. Many foreign merchants and most Brazilians who work in Ciudad del Este live
in Foz do Iguaçu and cross the border daily to work in Paraguay. Many Paraguayans
own imported goods stores in Foz do Iguaçu but live in Ciudad del Este. A 1998 survey
carried out by Paraguay’s Central Bank with 146 entrepreneurs of Ciudad del Este
showed that 28% were Paraguayans; 27% Asians; 24% Arabs; 11% Brazilians and other
10% of non-specified origin (Rabossi 2004: 80). Lebanese and Chinese migrants started
to arrive in Ciudad del Este in the late 1960’s, early 1970’s (Rabossi 2004: 205). There
is a mosque in each city and Foz do Iguaçu has a Buddhist temple. Japanese and French
schools may also be found in Ciudad del Este. The Arab segment is highly visible and is
divided into Christians and Muslims, mostly from Lebanon, Syria and Palestine. Since
the late 1950’s, Lebanese have had a prominent role in Foz do Iguaçu’s growth
(Rabossi 2004: 47). 
Languages of tourist traders from different parts of the world can be heard in this
social transfrontier space. Further, as a consequence of the ethnic segmentation, several
languages are commonly spoken in Ciudad del Este. In addition to Spanish and
Guarany, the two languages spoken in bilingual Paraguay, Portuguese, Arabic,
Cantonese, Taiwanese, English, Hindi and Korean (Rabossi 2004: 2) are the main
spoken languages there. The Arab TV channel Al-jazeera has long been watched in
Ciudad del Este reinforcing the presence of Arabic as a language. Given the enormous
flow of ‘shopping tourists’ from Brazil, Portuguese has become a strategic trading
language, a factor that has created economic opportunities for the many Brazilians who
work in Ciudad del Este in different occupations. Several surveys and assessments
indicate that Brazilians make up the largest segment working in Ciudad del Este
(Rabossi 2004: 81). 
The Friendship Bridge is crossed by thousands of people everyday. In 2001, the
daily average of vehicles and pedestrians crossing the bridge was  18,500 vehicles and
20,000 pedestrians (Rabossi 2004: 42). These numbers include people who ‘cross the
bridge only once (a minority), those who come and go at least once a day since they
work in Ciudad del Este or Foz do Iguaçu and live on the other side of the border, and
those who cross several times carrying loads, guiding someone or driving’ (idem: 43).
These people are the Brazilian baggers, ‘shopping tourists,’ tourists from different
countries, the paseros (Spanish for passers, meaning people whose job is to pass
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merchandise from one side of the border to the other) and laranjas  (Portuguese for
oranges, slang that designates false fronts, people who pretend to be buyers of certain
types of merchandise but are really working for someone else, usually for a tourist
trader). There are also the thousands who work transporting people and merchandise
around in regular taxis, moto-taxis (motorcycles that are taxis), vans, trucks and buses.
The Brazilian customs and Federal Police do not possess the adequate infrastructure to
control such a multitudinous flow. The busiest days are Wednesday and Saturday,
apparently because they are strategic for maximizing baggers’ weekly working
schedules (Rabossi 2004: 89-90). Wednesdays and Saturdays also attract more buyers
because these ‘shopping tourists’ are eager to take advantage of the great numbers of
people crossing the border, something that makes it more unlikely for a particular
person or vehicle to be stopped by customs officials. Great numbers form a non-
hegemonic strategy. Long lines often halt the dynamics of an economy that literally
relies on movement. Sometimes, for different reasons, mainly due to the tightening of
customs control on the Brazilian side, demonstrators may block the bridge creating lines
of buses, trucks and cars that run for kilometers. These stalemates are often felt, in
different ways, in the many other fragmented global spaces that are interconnected to
Ciudad del Este, such as the 25 de Março street, in the city of São Paulo.
In this unique universe of movers and traders paseros stand out. Rabossi (2004:
46) considers that they are responsible for most of the deals and transportation of
merchandise and correspond to some 5,000 passers, stratified according to those who
carry the heavy loads on their backs, on bicycles, motorcycles or cars. In 2001, more
than 500 passers were members of an Association of Eastern United Transporters of
Loads (idem) in Paraguay. Moto-taxi drivers are also organized in associations (Rabossi
2004: 73). Nationality matters in this transfrontier labor market. Oranges, for instance,
are Brazilians, usually women who use their monthly allowance to enter Brazil with
US$ 150.00 of tax-free imported merchandise. They sell their rights and transportation
services to the bagger. Oranges dread being stopped by the Brazilian custom. If this
happens their entry will be registered and their right to use the US$ 150.00 allowance
will only be valid again within a month’s time. If they keep working and are caught by
custom officials within this period of time the merchandise on them will be confiscated
(Rabossi 2004: 77-78).
There are flows both ways. There are Brazilian goods that are exported to
Paraguay, especially cigarettes, to re-enter Brazil as ‘smuggled merchandises.’ At least
in some periods, there is evidence that the importance of the Brazil-Paraguay flow was
greater than that of the Paraguay-Brazil flow (Rabossi 2004: 47). According to Rabossi
(p. 47), Brazilians control the flow of merchandise from Paraguay to Brazil. The
financial flows between the two cities are highly complex and are often the target of
different investigations by Brazil’s Central Bank and Federal Police. Ciudad del Este
has over 20 banks, several with headquarters in Brazil, Europe and the United States. A
study of the Paraguayan Central Bank showed that, between 1991 and 1997, US$ 900
million were transferred to Brazil (see Rabossi 2004: 66). Many armored cars
transferring money from Paraguay to Brazil are part of the intensive vehicle flow over
the Friendship Bridge. 
Market place anthropology has taught, among other lessons, that markets are loci
of inter-connections among different ethnic groups, ecological zones and production
sites. Ciudad del Este is a place that inter-connects many different production sites.
Further, given that the city is a major hub of grassroots globalization, it has connections
with different fragmented global spaces in the non-hegemonic global economy. On the
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one hand, the Arab and Chinese diasporas are instrumental in making the international
connections. On the other hand, Brazilian baggers are the concrete social agents that
connect Ciudad del Este to different fragmented global spaces of popular globalization
within Brazil. They usually are small entrepreneurs who run their own businesses in
their hometowns, most of the time either as street vendors or as the owners of a stall in
the so-called Imported Goods Markets. They are nomads – some travel twice a week --
and seldom are cosmopolitans since most of the time they connect only two global
fragmented spaces: the one where they buy their merchandise (Ciudad del Este, in our
case) and their point of sale. Their activities thus imply constant traveling, coming and
going, sometimes as far as 3,000km or more. They either take regular buses or, together
with other colleagues, rent a ‘tourist’ bus. Trips are long and tiresome and also very
tense (see Pérez Ortiz 2004 and Machado 2005). When shoppers go to Paraguay, they
carry considerable amounts of cash, their earnings and profits, in order to replace the
merchandises they have sold. When they go back home, they carry in the buses’
baggage compartment many thousands of dollars in new merchandise. They fear many
things. Buses can be robbed on the road either on their way to or from Paraguay. Their
merchandise may be confiscated by the Brazilian customs in Foz do Iguaçu. Buses can
also be stopped by Federal Highway Patrol anywhere before reaching their hometowns.
In this case, either the load is confiscated or steep bribes have to be paid. Last, but not
least, accidents are also common and so this turns these people’s trips into a permanent
cause for concern among those waiting at home their return. Many baggers consider
their trips to Ciudad del Este to be true Russian roulettes where anything can happen
(Figueiredo 2001). Moreover, the merchandise bought in Paraguay may still even be
confiscated by Brazil’s federal fiscal authorities during inspection raids on markets
where they are sold.
Tourist traders do not see themselves as smugglers. Even the word sacoleiros,
‘baggers’, is considered inappropriate to describe them. They see themselves as workers
or traders and try to avoid the negative connotations often attached to their activities.
They think of themselves as honest and hard-working people who have found an
economic niche that should not be considered equal to illegal activities such as drug
trafficking, money laundering and smuggling (for similar situations involving grassroots
global trading between African countries France, Germany and Italy, see MacGaffey
and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000) . Indeed, there are smuggler rings in the Ciudad del
Este/Foz do Iguaçu transfrontier that run complex and large operations which include
the use of airplanes and large trucks, the kind of equipment to which trader tourists have
no access. As many other informal market workers, trader tourists are ambiguous social
agents: they are small entrepreneurs who wish to work honestly but who make money
out of niches that escape state control. This ambiguity pervades the many contradictions
between ‘baggers’ and state authorities because these traders work in the open air, they
sell their merchandises on the streets. Working in public spaces grants a visibility that
turns them into political actors. They often organize themselves in associations, which
become the collective actors that intermediate the relations between them, the state and
politicians. It is not uncommon to see politicians hungry for votes become
spokespersons for these social agents of grassroots globalization. In fact, these traders
start to have more stable working conditions only after they become political subjects
that represent some kind of asset to politicians. Consumers also have ambiguous
feelings about them. While they know that the legality of baggers’ activity is
questionable, they enjoy having access to goods that are cheaper because they are not
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taxed or are fake copies. This is why it is so difficult to curb the expansion of what
hegemonic economic actors call piracy and smuggling. 
Anthropologists still have to make an effort to understand ethnographically this
form of contemporary global nomadic trade. Chinese young men and women, for
instance, who barely speak Portuguese, are often seen in the streets of Brasilia selling
all kinds of global gadgets. West Africans are street vendors in New York and
Washington. Africans are also transnational traders in France and other European
countries (MacGaffey and Bazenguissa-Ganga 2000). Women from Cabo Verde, the
African archipelago, travel to Fortaleza, Brazil, to buy goods they will sell back home.
These ‘connectors’ of fragmented global spaces are often ethnic groups such as the
Arabs, Chinese and Koreans in Brazil who may take advantage of their diasporic
networks around the world. Indeed, Asians, mostly Chinese and Koreans have started to
become an increasingly noticeable presence at Brasilia’s Paraguay Market, another
major global fragmented space of grassroots globalization.
The Paraguay Market in Brasilia: another global fragmented space.
Brasilia is located some 1,600km from Ciudad del Este. Nonetheless, the
Paraguayan city is an important economic force in the life of thousands of Brasilia’s
inhabitants. Many of them work in the more than 2,200 booths that make up the
Imported Goods Market, today’s official name for the Paraguay Market. The Paraguay
Market attracts a great number of shoppers from Brasilia and other cities – the Market
has turned into a tourist attraction for those who visit the place looking for discounts on
global status symbols. Hundreds of booths sell DVDs, computers, cell phones, software,
games, sunglasses, perfumes, cosmetics, clothes, sneakers, alcoholic beverages, the
latest movie downloaded from the Internet, etc.
The Paraguay Market, like other global fragmented spaces of grassroots
globalization, has a history related to urban economic cycles, migrations, street markets
as a source of economic opportunities for the urban poor, and urban conflicts in which
social movements, politicians and city authorities get involved time and again (Souza
2000). ‘Smuggling’ is a Federal crime in Brazil and almost everywhere, something that
immediately attracts the Federal authorities’ attention to a scenario that otherwise would
engage only local authorities. This is even more so the case in a federal capital where
the National Congress, the highest courts and institutions of the Executive Power are
located, including those responsible for national security and repression of federal
crimes. Many different kinds of national and international interest groups also have their
offices in Brasilia. Besides being the seat of the Brazilian state, Brasilia has its own
mystique as an urban center, since it was inaugurated in 1960 as the quintessential
example of modernist ideology on urbanism and architecture. The planned city has 500
thousand inhabitants and was declared a World Heritage Site by UNESCO, a fact that
has reinforced rules and regulations concerning Brasilia’s architecture and the use of its
urban space. The first and foremost question Paraguay Market workers have had to deal
with was how has it been possible that in the heart of Brazil’s capital a market of
smuggled goods has grown. 
The history of the Paraguay Market is a history of agents from the grassroots
segment of the global economy struggling to become formal economic agents. Since its
inception in 1990, with 30 street vendors working in a parking lot along W3 South, a
busy avenue, the market has rapidly spread into the more than 2,200 booths it is today.
Its transformation from an informal open-air street market to a formal popular market of
global gadgets was marked by a series of political struggles that lasted 7 years. In July
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1997, the Federal District government removed the open-air market to a new area,
located in a less noble and visible place where the Paraguay Market remains up to
today. After several political battles and street skirmishes the instability of the street
vendors would come to an end. The local government designed a plan through which
the ‘baggers’ would become ‘micro-importers.’ It was a way of moving these workers
from the informal to the formal market. Now these traders were to pay taxes and to be
respected as any other kind of merchant. The Paraguay Market was rechristened the
Imported Goods Market. Over the years, a process of internal differentiation has
occurred and some merchants have managed to control several stalls, thus expanding
their business into fancy stores.
These grassroots globalization social agents are migrants who moved to Brasilia
in search of economic opportunities. A research study carried out in 2001 (Figueiredo
2001) showed that 57.5% of them came from Brazil’s northeastern region, the poorest
in the country, and a traditional source of migrants to Brasilia. The greatest majority of
these traders live in Brasilia’s satellite cities, i.e. outside of the modernist planned city
where the upper middle class lives. Ten per cent of these traders come from four
northeastern cities an indication of the effectiveness of social networks in the
organization of migratory flows. These people are usually related and make up cliques,
corporate groups that act in defense of their interests within the market, especially
within the two associations that struggle to represent traders vis-à-vis the Federal
District’s government. These associations are related to the two major political parties
that dominate local politics. The associations’ history is marked by the political
alliances the street vendors had to make while working in the parking lots before they
were moved to the new and definitive location. 
Given its location in the federal capital, and its power to attract many thousands
of consumers, the Paraguay Market gained great visibility in the Brazilian media. The
Market was criticized by local merchants and shopping centers that accused street
vendors of unfair competition since they did not pay taxes, or have heavy expenses with
rents, employees’ wages, décor and other items. Representatives for important industry
lobbies located in São Paulo, the country’s main industrial center, such as the Brazilian
Toy Manufacturers’ Association expressed their criticisms too. The Paraguayan Market
was also criticized by representatives of Brazil’s major export processing zone located
in Manaus, 3,500km from Brasilia, in the heart of the Amazon region, with its hundreds
of manufacturers, mostly multinational corporation producers of electronic and
computer goods. Brasilia’s Paraguay Market became an example of the federal
government’s incapacity to control smuggling and piracy.  This combination of factors
turned the Paraguay Market into a main political issue, debated in the National
Congress, in different Ministries, and in different branches of the local executive and
legislative powers. Brasilia’s Paraguay Market indicates therefore how fragmented
global spaces of non-hegemonic economic globalization interconnect not only economic
agents and agencies located at different levels of integration but also political agents and
agencies representing powerful established interests anchored in local, national and
international dynamics. The fact that these political agents presented the Paraguay
Market as a threat to law abiding institutions and citizens clearly indicates how these
grassroots globalization activities are part of a non-hegemonic field. They need to be
regulated and normalized in order to cease being a threat to the established order.
Brasilia’s Paraguay Market is a rather expressive example of many other nodes
of the popular world system. In Buenos Aires Central Market there are some 1,000
booths that sell merchandise bought in Paraguay to as much as 30,000 shoppers a day.
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Colombia is full of ‘San Andresitos,’ the markets named after the free trade zone on the
Colombian island of San Andres in the Caribbean. Downtown Mexico City is full of
street vendors with global gadgets to be sold. West Africans on New York’s Fifth
Avenue in the 1980’s are another example (see Stoller 2002). In Manhattan, fake
Rolexes, sunglasses and all kinds of CDs could be bought on the streets. Shoppers could
also buy fake Rolexes at the world famous Xiu Shui Market, in Beijing. DVDs, shoes,
shirts, sweaters, coats, leather jackets, real silk, most with brand names such as
Timberland, Tommy Hillfinger, Nike, Adidas, Boss, Gucci, Prada, etc. could be found
at this market that was demolished to become a mega shopping center. In a
demonstration of how hegemonic economic globalization operates in Beijing, one
‘travel tips’ website proudly states: ‘What was once the home of fake designer brands in
Beijing is about to be replaced by a ‘no fakes’, ‘full English speaking’ mega mall.’
Conclusions about non-hegemonic economic practices and agents
Economic non-hegemonic movements are good examples of how structure and
anti-structure relations operate. Non-hegemonic systems suppose the existence of
hegemonic ones. Such systems also entail the existence of brokerage practices that I will
call, connecting mechanisms. The latter are the real processes through which both
systems communicate. In our examples above, politics proved to be the channel most
capable of creating flows between grassroots globalization agents and those
representing long established local, national and global interests. There are connecting
mechanisms that clearly relate to economic interests. These are indicated through the
money laundering that occurs in the transfrontier social space of Foz do Iguaçu/Ciudad
del Este as well as in formal transnational financial instruments such as the many credit
cards with which a shopper can buy anything in Ciudad del Este or in the Paraguay
Market in Brasilia. The differences between hegemonic and non-hegemonic systems are
blurred in the liminal situations in which connecting mechanisms allow for the
articulation of common political or economic interests of agents and brokers from both




Political and economic non-hegemonic globalization processes are power fields
that exist in relation to other established power fields that have the prerogative to
normalize the activities involved, by setting the standards of what is and what is not
legitimate. Movements for other globalizations are also formed by power-seekers. Alter-
native political movements seek state power or struggle against it. This is why many of
their leaders often become politicians. NGOs and governmental agencies also keep
close relations. NGO members often leave their institutions to work in state or
multilateral agencies. Alter-native economic movements seek access to wealth and to
the social, cultural and political benefits arising from it. Since struggles between non-
hegemonic movements and the establishment are mainly power struggles, they are often
mediated by several state agents. The police are clearly involved when activities occur
on the streets such as anti-globalization street demonstrations and cases with street
vendors and markets.
The converging of large numbers of people is part of alter-native transnational
agents’ strategies. Here the more the merrier prevails. The multitudes involved in open
air operations on the streets of Ciudad del Este, on Friendship Bridge and in Brasilia’s
Paraguay Market express the numbers of people who participate in this particular
segment of popular globalization and represent a form of overwhelming the state
structures deployed to manage the situation, a tactic also underlying political counter-
hegemonic street demonstrations.
Counter-hegemonic, non-hegemonic and hegemonic processes keep relations
analogous to those existing between structure and anti-structure. This does not mean
that they represent the exact inverted image or opposite dynamics of each other. I have
already mentioned the existence of connecting mechanisms, an indication that many
interests that at a first glance may look like opposites may be converging ones.  In
reality, these processes thrive on each other, something that is clear when we look at the
anti-alter globalization movement that chooses to demonstrate or to gather when major
meetings of global elites occur. Such is the case with the Davos/World Social Forum
mirror like situation as well as with the anti-globalization street demonstrations that
happen during WTO, World Bank or G-8 meetings. Notions of a shadow economy, of
informal versus formal economies, seem to confirm the existence of relations akin to
structure/anti-structure ones. However, grassroots economic globalization agents are not
really aiming at constructing another world. In reality, they aim at becoming rich and
powerful agents just like those who consider them illegal smugglers or pirates. It is the
rich and powerful who, through the control of state apparatuses and wider political
structures, create an anti-structural image of the workers and entrepreneurs from the
grassroots globalization segment. Without such a social representation it would be
impossible to control these activities and ‘informal markets’ would proliferate much
more than they actually do.
The construction of translocal links and translocal cultures is also a common
characteristic of other globalizations. Translocal links and networking are present in all
forms of other globalizations considered here. This indicates that alter-native
transnational agents disregard or bypass the normative and regulating power of nation-
states. Translocal political links are often studied under the rubric of transnational
activism and global civil society. Transnational political cultures still need to be studied
more in-depth ethnographically. Most existing studies are on transnational elites, for
instance, Ulf Hannerz’ (2004) work on foreign correspondents or my own on the World
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Bank ethnic diversity (Ribeiro 2003). Studies on transmigrants, such as those by Linda
Basch, Nina Glick-Schiller and Cristina Szanton Blanc (1994), do reveal transnational
agents’ political or economic practices. Other works on migration and transnationalism
also show how migrants upset existing boundaries and power structures creating
translocal networks and cultures (Kearney, 1996, and Sahlins, 1997, for instance). We
still need however a stronger focus on real globalization from below. For this involves
processes through which migratory labor and/or contemporary global nomads become
involved as alter-native transnational agents in order to get their share of global flows of
wealth. 
In their practices, transnational political activists by definition rely on
transnational links and networks. Similarly, transnational grassroots traders, in their
practices, blur borders creating transfrontier social spaces and linking different global
fragmented spaces. If we look at the whole span of the networks created between the
Paraguay Market in Brasilia and some Asian countries we will see that these traders’
activities rely totally on the functioning of transnational networks that operate through
the articulation of several brokers and global fragmented spaces. In sum, both political
and economic alter-native transnational agents rely on highly complex articulations of
heterogeneous social agents and on the consortiation of different powers of agency
defined at different levels of integration spread on a global scale.
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ANNEX 1
WORLD SOCIAL FORUM 2005
PORTO ALEGRE, BRAZIL
Brazilian Organizing Committee 
ABONG – Associação Brasileira de Organizações Não Governamentais
www.abong.org.br
AMB - Confederação Nacional das Associações de Moradores
Attac – Ação pela Tributação das Transações Financeiras em Apoio aos Cidadãos
www.attac.org
Conam
Cáritas Brasil  -  www.caritasbrasileira.org
CAT – Central Autônoma de Trabalhadores  -  www.cat-ipros.org.br/
CBJP – Comissão Brasileira de Justiça e Paz da CNBB  -  www.cbjp.org.br
Cives – Associação Brasileira de Empresários pela Cidadania  -  www.cives.com.br
Clacso – Consejo Latinamericano de Ciencias Sociales  -  www.clacso.org
CMP – Central de Movimentos Populares  -  www.cmp-brasil.org
Comitê Organizador do Acampamento Intercontinental da Juventude  -
www.acampamentofsm.org
Comitê Afro do FSM  -  kikabessen@hotmail.com
CUT – Central Única dos Trabalhadores  -  www.cut.org.br
FBOMs – Fórum Brasileiro de ONGs e Movimentos Sociais para o Meio Ambiente e o
Desenvolvimento  -  www.fboms.org.br/
GTA – Grupo de Trabalho Amazônico  -  www.gta.org.br
Ibase – Instituto Brasileiro de Análises Sociais e Econômicas  -  www.ibase.br
IPF – Instituto Paulo Freire  -  www.paulofreire.org
Jubileu Sul Brasil  -  www.jubileesouth.org  -  www.jubileubrasil.org.br
Marcha Mundial das Mulheres  -   www.sof.org.br/marchamulheres
MST – Movimento dos Trabalhadores Rurais Sem Terra  -  www.mst.org.br
Rede Social de Justiça e Direitos Humanos  -  www.social.org.br
UJS – União da Juventude Socialista  -  www.ujs.org.br/
UNE – União Nacional dos Estudantes  -  www.une.org.br
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COMPOSITION OF THE INTERNATIONAL COUNCIL
INTERNATIONAL SECRETARIAT OF WORLD SOCIAL FORUM
Brazilian Organizing Committee
Indian Organizing Committee  -  www.wsfindia.org
Delegates
50 Years is Enough!  -  www.50years.org
ABONG - Associação Brasileira de ONGs  -  www.abong.org.br
ACTU - Australian Council of Trade Unions  -  www.actu.asn.au
AFL-CIO - American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations
www.aflcio.org/home.htm
Africa Trade Network  -  http://africatradenetwork.com
AIDC - Alternative Information on Development Center  -  http://aidc.org.za
ALAI - Agencia Latinoamericana de Informacion  -  www.alainet.org
ALAMPYME – Assoc. Latino Americana de Pequenos e Médios Empresários
www.apyme.com.ar
Aliança Por Um Mundo Responsável e Solidário  -  www.alliance21.org
All Arab Peasants & Agricultural Co-operatives Union
ALOP - Assoc. Latino Americana de Organismos de Promoção  -  www.alop.or.cr
Alternative Information Center  -  www.alternativenews.org
Alternatives Information Center  -  http://aidc.org.za
Alternatives  -  www.alternatives.ca
Alternatives Rússia
Amigos da Terra  -  www.foei.org
APRODEV  -  www.aprodev.net
Arab NGO Network for Development  -  www.annd.org
ARENA - Asian Regional Exchange for New Alternatives  -  www.asianexchange.org
Articulación Feminista Marco Sur  -  www.mujeresdelsur.org.uy
ASC - Aliança Social Continental  -  www.ascahsa.org
Asemblea de los Pueblos del Caribe (APC)  -  http://movimientos.org/caribe/
Assemblée Europeenne dês Citoyens  -  www.cedetim.org/AEC
Assembléia das Nações Unidas dos Povos
Associação para o Progresso das Comunicações  -  www.apc.org
ATTAC- Brasil  -  www.attac.org/brasil
ATTAC France  -  http://attac.org
Babels
Bankwatch Network  -  www.bankwatch.org
CADTM- Comité pour l’Annulation de la Dette du Tiers Monde  -  http://users.skynet.be/cadtm
Canadian Council
Caritas Internacionalis  -  www.caritas.org
CBJP - Comissão Brasileira de Justiça e Paz  -  www.cbjp.org.br
CEAAL – Cons. Educação de Adultos da Am. Latina  -  www.ceaal.org
CEDAR Internacional  -  www.cedarinternational.net
CEDETIM- Centre dEtudes et d Initiatives de Solidarité Internationale
www.cedetim.org
Central de Trabajadores Argentinos  -  www.cta.org.ar
CES – European Trade Union Confederation  -  www.etuc.org
CETRI  -  www.cetri.be
CIDSE  -  www.cidse.org
CIOSL - Confederação Internacional de Organizações Sindicais Livres
www.cioslorit.org
CIVES  -  www.cives.org.br
CLACSO  -  www.clacso.org
CLC - Canadian Labour Congress  -  www.clc-ctc.ca
CMT – Confederação Mundial do Trabalho  -  www.cmt-wcl.org
COMPA – Convergência de los Movimientos de los Pueblos de las Américas
CONAIE  -  http://conaie.org
Congresso Nacional Indígena do México
Conselho Mundial de Igrejas  -  www.wcc-coe.org
Coordenación del Foro “El Otro Davos”
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Coordenadora de Centrais Sindicais do Cone Sul
Corpwatch  -  www.corpwatch.org
COSATU - Congress of South African Trade Unions  -  www.cosatu.org.za
CRID – Centre de Recherche et d´Information pour le Développment
www.crid.asso.fr
CUT – Central Única dos Trabalhadores  -  www.cut.org.br
Encuentros Hemisféricos contra el ALCA
ENDA  -  www.enda.sn
Euralat
Euromarches  -  www.euromarches.org
FAMES
FECOC - Frente Continental de Organizações Comunitárias
Federación Mundial de Juventudes Democráticas  -  www.wfdy.org
Féderation démocratique internationale des femmes (FDIF)  -  www.fdif.eu.org
Fundación per la Pau/International Peace Bureau (IPB)  -  www.ipb.org
FIAN – Food First International Action Network  -  www.fian.org
FIDH – Fed. Internacional Direitos Humanos  -  www.fidh.org
Focus on the Global South  -  http://focusweb.org
Fórum Dakar
Forum Mondial des Alternatives  -  www.alternatives-action.org/fma
Forum of the Poor
Fórum Social Italiano
GLBT South-South Dialogue
Global Exchange  -  www.globalexchange.org
Global Policy Network  -  www.globalpolicynetwork.org
Greenpeace  -  www.greenpeace.org.br
Grito dos Excluídos  -  www.movimientos.org
Grupo de Trabalho Amazônico  -  www. gta.org.br
Habitat Internation Coalition  -  www.habitat-international-coalition.org
IATP – Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy  -  www.iatp.org
IBASE  -  www.ibase.br
ICAE – Conselho Internacional de Educação de Adultos  -  www.web.net/icae
IFAT - International Federationof Alternative Trade  -  www.ifat.org
IFG – International Forum on Globalization  -  www.ifg.org
International Gender and Trade Network  -  www.genderandtrade.net
International Network of Street Papers (INSP) www.irn.org
Instituto Paulo Freire www.paulofreire.org
IPS – Inter Press Service www.ips.org
Jubilee South – Asia www.jubileesouth.org
Jubileo South – África www.jubileesouth.org
Jubileu 2000
Jubileu Sul América Latina www.jubileusul.hpg.com.br
KCTU - Korean Confederation of Trade Unions www.kctu.org
KOPA http://antiwto.jinbo.net/eroom/index.html
Land Research Action Network
MST – Movimento dos Trabalhadores Sem Terra www.mst.org.br
Narmada www.narmada.org
NIGD - Network Institute for Global Democratization www.nigd.org
North-South Centre www.coe.int/T/E/North-South_Centre
OCLAE - Continental Organization of Latin America and Caribbean Students
www.oclae.org
Oneworld www.unimondo.org
Organization of African Trade Unions Unity
ORIT – Org. Regional Interamericana de Trabalhadores www.orit-ciosl.org
OXFAM Internacional www.oxfam.org
Peace Boat www.peaceboat.org




Red Latinoamericana Mulheres Transformando a Economia
http://movimientos.org/remte
Rede APM – Agricultures paysannes, sociétés et mondialisation
www.zooide.com/apm
Rede CONSEU (Conferencia de Naciones sin Estado de Europa)
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Rede Dawn de Mulheres www.dawn.org.fj
Rede de Solidariedade Ásia Pacífico
Rede Latino-Americana e Caribenha de Mulheres Negras www.criola.ong.org
Rede Mulher e Habitat http://www.redmujer.org.ar
Rede Mundial de Mulheres pelos Direitos Reprodutivos www.wgnrr.org
Rede Palestina de ONGs www.pngo.net
Rede Social de Justiça e Direitos Humanos www.social.org.br
Rede Transforme!
Redes Socioeconomia Solidaria www.reasnet.com
REPEM – Rede de Educação Popular entre Mulheres www.repem.org.uy
SIGTUR - Southern Initiative on Globalisation and Trade Union Rights
Social Watch www.socialwatch.org
Solidar www.solidar.org
TNI – Transnational Institute www.tni.org
TWN – Third World Network www.twnside.org.sg
UBUNTU - Foro Mundial de Redes de la Sociedad Civil www. www.ubuntu.upc.es
Union Internacional de Estudiantes www. www. ius-uie.org
Via Campesina http://ns.rds.org.hn/via/
World Association of Community Radio Broadcasters (Amarc)
http://www.amarc.org
World March of Women www.ffq.qc.ca/marche2000/en/index.html
Znet www.zmag.org
OBSERVERS
Organizing Committee of the African Social Forum
Organizing Committee of the Americas Social Forum www.forosocialamericas.org
Organizing Committee of the European Social Forum www.fse-esf.org
Organizing Committee of the Mediterranean Social Forum fsmedi@terra.es
Organizing Committee of the of the Pan-Amazonic Social Forum www.fspanamazonico.com.br
Organizing Committee of the Thematic Social Forum: Democracy, Human Rights, War
and Drug Traffic www.fsmt.org.co
FNTG - Funders Network on Trade & Globalization www.fntg.org
OBS: The list has the names of 19 organisations that have joined the International Council of the
WSF, which have been approved at the plenary on April 6, 2004, in Passignano Sul Trasimeno and
Isola Polvese (Peruggia), Italy.
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ANNEX 2
WORLD SOCIAL FORUM 2004 
MUMBAI, INDIA.
Members of the India General Council 
The India General Council was the decision making body of the WSF India process. The
membership to the IGC was open to all social movements and organizations that are committed to
the WSF Charter of principles. List of 135 members of the IGC. 
ABHIYAN
Aalochana - Centre For Documentation And Research on Women






All India Agricultural Workers Union
All India Bank Employees Association
All India Beedi Workers Organisation
All India Catholic University Federation
All India Central Council of Trade Unions
All India Democratic Womenâ€™s Association
All India Federation of Electricity Workers
All India Federation of Trade Unions
All India Federation of University and College Teachers Organisation
All India General Insurance Employees Association
All India Insurance Employees Association
All India Insurance Employees Association
All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS)
All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS)/ BKMU
All India Kisan Sangharsh Samiti
All Indian Bank Officers' Association
All India Newspaper Employees Federation
All India Peace & Solidarity Organisation
All India People Science Network
All India Progressive Womenâ€™s Association
All India Railwaymens Federation
All India State Government Employees Federation
All India Student Association
All India Students Federation
All India Trade Union Congress




Association of Rural Education and Development Service
Awaze Niswan
Bank Employees Federation of India
BDM
Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samiti




Calcutta Leather Tannery Workmen's Union
Calcutta Leather Tannery Workmen's Union
CALL
Campaign Against Child Labour
Campaign For Right To Livelihood And Food Security (Tamil Nadu)
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Centre for Education and Communication
Centre For Education and Documentation
Centre for Humanitarian Assistance
Centre for Research on New International Economic Order
Centre for Technology Development
Centre for Workers' Management
Centre of Indian Trade Unions
Chhatishgarh Jaiv Suraksha Manch
CHPD
Church Auxiliary for Social Action
CNISBSS
Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace
Committee Against Violence on Women
Community Contextual Communication Centre






Democratic Youth and Students Organisation
Democratic Youth Federation of India
Division of Social Action
Don Bosco South Asia Forum for Youth at Risk
Durbar Mahila Samanwaya Committee
Ekta Trust
Electricity Employees Federation Of India
Equitable Marketing Association
Evangelical Fellowship of India Commission On Relief
Federation of Medical Representatives Associations of India
Focus on Global South
Forum Against Globalisation
Forum against oppression of women
Forum For Creches And Childcare Services
Free Software Foundation of India
FWFPF
Gandhi Peace Foundation
General Insurance Employees Union
Gramodaya
Happy Hawkers
Hind Kisan Mazdoor Sabha
Hind Mazdoor aur Kisan Panchayat
Hind Mazdoor Sabha
Human Potential Development Programme
Human Rights Forum for Dalit Liberation
Income Tax Employees Federation
India Climate Justice forum
Indian Confederation of Labour
Indian Network on Ethics and Climate Change
Indian Social Action Forum
Indian Social Institute
Institute for Social Education and Development












Jharkhand State Bank Employees Association
Joint Womens Programme
J P Foundation for Asian Democracies















Naga Peoples Association for Human Rights
National Alliance for Womens Organisations
National Alliance of Peoples Movements
National Campaign Committee for Rural Workers
National Campaign for Human Rights
National Centre for Advocacy Studies
National Centre for Labour
National Confederation of Labour
National Council of Dalit Human Rights
National Dalit Forum
National Federation of Dalit Women
National Federation of Indian Women
National Federation of Postal Employees
National Forum for Unorganised Labour
National Forum of Forest Workers & Forest People
National Front of Adivasis
National Minerals & Mines Group
National Network of Autonomous Womens' Organisations
National Union of Journalists
National Youth Federation
Nature Human Centric Peoples Movement
NCPRI
New Trade Union Initiative
Nivara Hakk Suraksha Samiti
North East Network
Orissa Adivasi Adhikar Abhijan
Orissa Development Action Forum
People's Union for Civil Libraries
Popular Education & Action Centre
Pragatisheel Lekhak Sangh






Rashtriya Jan Chetna Sangharsh Morcha












South Central India Network for Development Alternative
South Orissa Development Alternatives Network
Stree Mukti Sanghatana
Stree Vedi
Student Federation of India
Swayam
TAFSC
Tamil Nadu Womens Collective
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Terre des Hommes (Germany) IP
The Information And Feature Trust 





Vikalp All India Cultural forum
Vikas Adhyayan Kendra
Voluntary Action Network Anantapur
WECAN
YMCA
Young Womens' Christian Association
Yuva Bharat
******************************************************************************
India Working Organisations (IWC) 
The India Working Committee is responsible for formulating policy guidelines that form the basis
for the functioning of the WSF India process. The IWC currently consists of 67 organizations
nominated from the IGC and is indicative of the diverse social, political and economic gamut. The
IWC comprises of 14 national trade unions and workers' organisations, 8 national women's
organisations, 6 national farmers' networks, and 4 national platforms each of dalits, adivasis, 4
student and youth bodies, as well as 27 social movements, other organisations and NGOs.
Dalit:
NACDOR
National Council of Dalit Human Rights (NCDHR)
National Dalit Forum





National Front of Adivasis
Women:
All India Democratic Women's Association (AIDWA)
All India Progressive Women's Association (AIPWA)
Mahila Dakshata Samiti
National Federation of Indian Women (NFIW)
National Network of Autonomous Women's Organisations
National Alliance for Womens Organisations (NAWO)
North East Network
Sangat
Kisan & Rural Workers:
All India Agricultural Workers Union (AIAWU)
All India Kisan Sabha (AIKS)
All India Kisan Sangharsh Samiti
Hind Kisan Mazdoor Sabha (HKMS)
Kisan Samanvaya Samiti
National Campaign Committee for Rural Workers (NCCRW)
Working People:
All India Bank Employees Association (AIBEA)
All India Central Council of Trade Unions (AICCTU)
All India Federation of Trade Unions (AIFTU)
All India Insurance Employees Association (AIIEA)
All India Railwaymens Federation (AIRF)
All India State Government Employees Federation (AISGEF)
All India Trade Union Congress (AITUC)
Centre of Indian Trade Unions (CITU)
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Confederation of Central Government Employees &Workers (CCGEW)
Hind Mazdoor Sabha (HMS)
National Campaign Committee for Unorganised Labour
National Centre for labour
National Forum of Forest Workers & Forest People
New Trade Union Initiative (NTUI)
Youth & Students:
All India Students Federation (AISF) / All India Youth Federation (AIYF)
NCCI (Y)
Rashtra Yuva Organisation
Student Federation of India (SFI) / Democratic Youth Federation of India (DYFI)
Other Social Movements & Mass Organisations:
All India Peace & Solidarity Organisation (AIPSO)
All India People Science Network (AIPSN)
Amnesty International
Bharat Gyan Vigyan Samiti (BGVS)
Campaign Against Child Labour (CACL)
Centre for Education and Communication (CEC)
Centre for Technology Development (CTD)
Coalition for Nuclear Disarmament and Peace (CNDP)
COVA
Focus on Global South (FOCUS)
Gandhi Peace Foundation (GPF)
Human Potential Development Programme
India Social Institute
INSAF
Jan Sangharsh Morcha (JSM)
Jan Swasthya Abhiyan (JSA)
Mines, Minerals and People
MKSS
NAFRE
Naga People's Association for Human Rights
National Alliance of people's Movements (NAPM)







India Organising Committee (IOC) 
The India Organising Committee is the executive body of the WSF 2004 and
is responsible for organising the event. The IOC consists of 45 individuals,
each being a member of one of the eight working groups 
A. D. Golandaz          Amit Sen Gupta          Anil Mishra                    Arun Kumar
Ashok Bharti             Bulu Sareen               Chandita Mukherjee       Damayanti Bhattacharya
Dilawar Khan            Dinesh Abrol               Gautam Mody               Geeta Mahajan
H. Mahadevan           Ilina Sen                    J.Vincent                      Jaya Velankar
K.Bhaskaran             Kamal Mitra Chenoy    Madhusree Dutta           Meena Menon
Minar Pimple             Mohan Kotekar           Mukta Srivastava          Mukul Sharma
Nandita Shah            P. K. Das                    P. K. Murthy                 Prabir Purkayastha
R.A.Mittal                  R.S.R.Selwine            Rabial Mallik                  Rajendra Giri
Rajendra Ravi            Rosamma                  Sanjeev Kaura               Sheelu
Somya Dutta             Soni Thengamom       Srilata Swaminathan      Stanley William
Subhash Lomte          Uday Bhat               Vasant Gupte                    Vijay Pratap




The Mumbai organising committee consists of organisations based in Mumbai
that are represented in each of the functional groups
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ANNEX 3
SPONSORS AND SUPPORTERS OF THE
MEETINGS AND OF THE ‘WSF PROCESS’
2001
- Electric Energy State Company of Rio Grande do Sul 
- Bank of the State of Rio Grande do Sul
- The city of Porto Alegre
- The Pontifical Catholic University
- Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul
- Government of the State of Rio Grande do Sul.
- NGOs
2003
Sponsors: Petrobras, Ford Foundation, Fundação Banco do Brasil
Supporters: action aid, cafod, ccfd, eed, heinrich boll stiftung, icco, misereor, n(o)vic Oxfam
Netherlands, Oxfam International, Oxfam Belgium, Oxfam America.
2004 
WSF process supported by:
Petrobras, Caixa Econômica Federal, the Ford Foundation and Brazil Postoffice. . 
Support for the World Social Forum 2004, in India:
- Action Aid, United Kingdom
- Alternatives, Canada
- Attac Norge Solidarites, Norway
- Comité Catholique Contre la Faim et pour le development (CCFD), France
- Christian Aid, United Kingdom
- Development and Peace, Canada
- Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (EED), Germany
- Funders Network on Trade and Globalisation (FNTG), United States
- Heinrich Boll Foundation, Germany
- Humanist Institute for Co-operation with Developing Countries (HIVOS), Netherlands
- Inter Church Organisation for Development Co-operation (CCO), Netherlands
- Oxfam International
- Swedish International Development Co-operation Agency (SIDA), Sweden
- Solidago Foundation, United States
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- Swiss Agency for Development Cooperation (SDC), Switzerland
- Tides Foundation, United States
- World Council of Churches, Switzerland
- Members of India General Council for their solidarity contribution, India
2005
- Banco do Brasil S.A.
- Petrobras 
- Caixa Econômica Federal (Brazil)
- Eletrobrás (Brazil)
- Infraero (Brazil)
- Furnas (Brazil) 
- eed - Evangelischer Entwicklungsdienst (Church Development Services, an
organization of the Protestant churches in Germany) 
- Christian Aid (an agency of the churches in the UK and Ireland) 
- CCFD (Comité Catholique contre la Faim et pour le Développement, France)
- n(o)vib (Oxfam, Holanda) 
- CAFOD (Catholic Agencies for Overseas Development, a British organization)
- Rockfeller Brothers Fund (U.S.)
- Misereor (the German Catholic Bishops’ Organization for Cooperation and
Development).
